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I.
PARTIES TO THIS PROCEEDING
The parties to this proceeding are identified in the caption.
Appellant

Bonnie

Thornock was the plaintiff

Dorothy Jensen was the defendant.

ii

below;

Respondent
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IV.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to §§78-2-2(3) (k) and 7829-3(2) (j), U.C.A.

The Order granting summary judgment was entered

on July 30, 1996 (R.62-65; A.1-4).

Appellant's timely notice of

appeal was filed on August 19, 1996 (R. 72-74) . This proceeding was
transferred

from the Supreme

Court to this Court on or about

October 22, 1996.
V.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
This

appeal

is

from

an

order

granting

summary

judgment.

Accordingly, this Court reviews all issues as questions of law for
correctness, with no deference to the conclusions of the trial
court.

See Schurtz v. BMW of North America, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108,

1111-12 (Utah 1991).
The issues presented for review are:
(1)

Whether or not the court below erred by granting summary
judgment
release,

in favor of
where

the defendant

that

defendant

on the basis of a

was

not

named

or

specifically identified therein as required by §78-27-42,
U.C.A.
(2)

(preserved for review at R.35-37).

Whether or not the court below erred in granting summary
judgment in favor of the defendant, where it selectively
1

used extrinsic evidence to alter the terms of a release,
which the court

itself

found to be unambiguous, and

resolved disputed issues of fact (preserved for review at
R.91-92, 95) .
VI.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE1
Section 78-27-42, Utah Code Annotated:
A release given by a person seeking
recovery to one or more defendants
does
not
discharge
any
other
defendant unless the release so
provides.

VII.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, Disposition in the
Lower Court.
This appeal arises out of a negligence suit including an

automobile

accident,

which

occurred

on

November

15,

1993.

Plaintiff Bonnie Thornock filed suit on February 22, 1994, alleging
that

Defendant

Dorothy

Jensen

was

negligent

in

causing

that

accident (R.l-5). After answering the Complaint, Mrs. Jensen moved
for summary judgment, on the basis of a "release" signed by Mrs.
Thornock

on or

about

November

30, 1993

x

(R.16-17, 30; A. 5 ) .

This
appeal
involves
no determinative
provisions, ordinances, rules or regulations.
2

constitutional

Plaintiff appeals from the Order granting summary judgment in favor
of

defendant

maintains,

and

that

dismissing

the

her

action

(A.1-4).

Plaintiff

release, upon which

defendant

relies, is

ineffective because it lists only Lowell Jensen, the defendant's
husband, instead of the defendant (A.5).
Defendant filed her motion for summary judgment and supporting
memorandum on April 30, 1996 (R.16-30).

Defendant relied solely

upon the release (A.5), but did not assert, that she was to have
been named in addition to, or instead of, her husband

(R.16-22).

Rather, defendant expressly argued, that she came within the ambit
of broad boilerplate language, purporting to release anyone who
might be liable (R.19-20).

In addition to the release, defendant

submitted an affidavit from Jim Lancaster in support of her motion
(R.27-29).

Mr. Lancaster was the adjuster for defendant's insurer,

Windsor Insurance Group, who obtained Mrs. Thornock's signature on
the release

(R.27-29).

Lancaster testifies as to the general

circumstances of the signing of the release, and his opinion as to
its meaning.

(R.28-29).

His affidavit is silent as to why the

release names only Mr. Jensen (R.27-29).
Plaintiff's opposing memorandum (R.35-39), which was filed on

I
or about May 23, 1996, relied upon §78-27-42, U.C.A., as construed
by the Utah Supreme Court in Child v. Newsome, 892 P. 2d 9 (Utah
1995).

Plaintiff argued, that, under that holding, Mrs. Jensen
3

could not be discharged by a release naming only her husband (R.3637).

Because her opposition was based solely upon a controlling

point

of law, plaintiff,

at that

time, offered

no

supporting

evidence for her position.
In her reply (R.40-46), which was filed on or about June 7,
1996, defendant

argued,

for the

first

time, that

the parties

actually intended Dorothy Jensen, rather than Lowell Jensen, to
have been named in the release.

Noting that she was the one

involved in the accident, defendant states:
[T] o whom else could the Release
have applied except Dorothy Jensen?
Semantics
aside,
plaintiff
and
[Windsor] entered in to a Release
which the parties intended to apply
to Dorothy Jensen.
(R.45).
Defendant also offered a Supplemental Affidavit from Lancaster
(R.47-49).

He states, there, that he and plaintiff negotiated, and

intended to release, claims against Dorothy Jensen (R.48).

He also

states that Lowell's name appeared on the release (presumably, by
mistake) because he "is the policyholder" (R.48) . That is the only
explanation offered by defendant for the discrepancy.
In response to the Supplemental Affidavit, plaintiff offered
her own affidavit on or about June 20, 1996 (R.56-58).

Plaintiff

states, that the $469.00, which she received, was intended to cover
only her broken glasses and lost wages to the date of the release
4

(R.57).

She states, that she "never intended to release anyone,

especially the negligent driver, defendant Dorothy Jensen" (R.57).
She also states, that the release was "blank" when she signed it
and, that she "simply took Mr. Lancaster, at his word, " that it was
for her glasses and lost time to date (R.57).
Oral argument was held on June 21, 1996

(R.82-107).

The

parties disagreed as to whether or not the release was ambiguous
and, if it was, as to the intention of the parties.

The court

ruled for defendant, stating:
[T]he release was not ambiguous . .
when Mrs. Thornock signed the
release she intended to release the
defendant . . . That's the only
reasonable
method
to
read
the
release, because that's the only
defendant with whom she was dealing.
(R.105).
A written

order, granting

defendant's

judgment, was entered on July 30, 1996

motion

(A. 1-4).

for

summary

Among other

things, the court found: that plaintiff received $469.00 "for outof-pocket expenses, pain and suffering"; that "the Release is not
ambiguous"; that "the intent of the parties is clear on the face of
the

Release

.

.

. [They]

intended

the

Release

to

apply

to

[plaintiff's] claims against Dorothy Jensen" (R.63-64).
Plaintiff filed her timely notice of appeal on August 19,
1996.

5

B.

Statement of the Facts Relevant to the Issues Presented for
Review.
The only evidence presented by defendant was the release

itself and the two affidavits given by Lancaster (A.5; R.27-30, 5052).

Plaintiff's

affidavit

evidence

(A.5; R.56-58).

consisted

of

the

The uncontradicted

release

and

her

portions of the

pleadings would also be taken as true for purposes of summary
judgment.
Certain facts are undisputed here.

Mrs. Thornock and Mrs.

Jensen were involved in an automobile accident, on November 15,
1993.

Mr. Jensen was not, although the policy covering the Jensen

vehicle was in his name.

The document in question--the release--

was executed on or about November 30, 1993, about two weeks later.
Mrs. Thornock was not represented by counsel at that time.
also under

treatment

and

taking pain medication

received $469.00 from Windsor.

She was

(R.57).

She

As of February 1994, when the

complaint was filed, plaintiff's medical bills already exceeded
$6,000 (R.2).2
Obviously, what the release "says" is not in dispute.

On its

face, it purports to be a full release as to any claim, which
plaintiff might have against Lowell Jensen.

It is also noteworthy,

that the release is not dated, witnessed or notarized.
2

It is not

Plaintiff has also alleged that she has suffered a partial,
possibly permanent, impairment (R.3).
6

signed by Lowell Jensen, Dorothy Jensen, Jim Lancaster or anyone
from Windsor.

It does not purport to be mutual.

It is a form,

boilerplate document, prepared by Windsor, with blank spaces to be
completed.

Defendant does not deny, that the release form was

blank when signed (R.56-57).
The factual dispute, here, relates to the circumstances, under
which the document was executed, and the intent of parties.
According to Mr. Lancaster's first affidavit, this was intended to
be a full and complete release of any claim against anybody
generally

(R.28).

He states that the $460.00 was for Mrs.

Thornock's glasses and any expenses, pain and suffering, and that
he explained to Mrs. Thornock that it was a full and complete
release (R.28).

According to Lancaster's second, supplemental,

affidavit, the parties specifically intended to release Dorothy
Jensen (R.51). Mrs. Thornock's affidavit denies that she intended
to release anyone--particularly Dorothy Jensen (R.56-58).

She

states, that Mr. Lancaster represented to her that she was being
paid only for broken eye glasses and for a couple of weeks of lost
wages.
VIII.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The error committed below is readily apparent, as is the
injustice of the decision.

The court allowed defendant and her
7

insurer to "have their proverbial cake and eat it too."

They were

allowed to retain the advantage of a signature, which was obtained
by questionable means, while avoiding the consequences of putting
"Lowell Jensen" on the form.
If the release is unambiguous, as the court held, it cannot be
effective as to claims against Dorothy Jensen because she is not
named therein.

If extrinsic evidence is allowed to change "Lowell"

to "Dorothy," then the release must be ambiguous.

In that case,

other extrinsic evidence is also admissible, and there exists a
factual dispute as to the parties' intent and the effectiveness of
the release.
A.

In either event, summary judgment was improper.

The Release Cannot Be Effective as to an Unnamed Party.
Section 78-27-42, U.C.A. provides, that a release as to one

defendant

"does not

release so provides."

discharge

any

other

defendant

unless

the

Pursuant to that provision, "a release must

contain language either naming the defendant or identifying the
defendant with some degree of specificity in order to discharge
that defendant from liability."
(Utah 1995) .
not

Child v. Newsome, 892 P.2d 9, 12

Dorothy Jensen is not named in the release.

She is

identified with the degree of specificity, required under

Child.

The release cannot discharge defendant, as a matter of law.

8

B.

If the Release is Open to Interpretation as to the Party
Released, It Is Open to a Factual Dispute as to the Parties'
Overall Intent.
Extrinsic evidence, such as that required to change "Lowell"

to "Dorothy," is admissible only if the release is ambiguous.

See

Krauss v. Utah State Dept. of Transp., 852 P.2d 1014, 1019 (Utah
App. 1993) .3

Once that door is open, there is a fact issue as to

the parties' true
evidence

intent, as to which all relevant

is admissible. JEd.

If that evidence

extrinsic

is in dispute,

summary judgment is improper.

See Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813

P.2d

Indeed,

104, 108

"ambiguous"

(Utah 1991).

release

(one

requiring

evidence ) is simply invalid.
999, 1002

it

is arguable, that

interpretation

via

an

parole

See Simonsen v. Travis, 728 P. 2d

(Utah 1986) ("a release, to be enforceable, must at a

minimum be unambiguous, explicit and unequivocal").
Here, extrinsic evidence was necessarily relied upon to change
"Lowell Jensen" to "Dorothy Jensen." Therefore, the release had to
be ambiguous, and the court below erred in holding otherwise.
Moreover, once the court resorted to extrinsic evidence, it could

3

The court, in Krauss, rejected the argument that §78-27-42
required that the party claiming to be discharged be named in the
release. See 852 P.2d at 1018. It was overruled on that point in
Child, 892 P. 2d at 11, n.4. Notwithstanding that aspect of its
reasoning, the court in Krauss proceeded to hold that UDOT had
failed to carry its burden to prove that it was an intended
beneficiary of the release. See 852 P.2d at 1022-23.
9

not ignore the factual dispute, which existed as to the parties'
intentions.

It could not grant summary judgment on the basis of a

release which was less than unambiguous and unequivocal.
IX.
ARGUMENT
In her motion, as originally presented, defendant specifically
relied upon the broad, general language of the release, which
purported to discharge anyone who might be liable (R.18-26).

That

argument is directly contrary to Child v. Newsome, 8 92 P.2d 9, 12
(Utah 1995), which is dispositive here.

As a matter of law, a

party not named in a release cannot claim to be discharged by it.
Id.
Faced with Child, defendant changed her argument.

Instead of

asserting that she was covered by the general language of the
release, defendant maintained that the claims against her were the
actual object of the release, notwithstanding that it expressly
referred

only

necessarily

to

relied

her

husband.

upon

extrinsic

In

that

evidence,

regard,
in

the

defendant
from

of

Lancaster's testimony as to what was intended. Defendant, thereby,
opened

the

door

to

other

extrinsic

evidence--namely,

Mrs.

Thornock's affidavit--which creates a factual dispute as to intent.
That dispute renders summary judgment inappropriate.

10

Finally, there is an issue of simple justice and fairness
here.

It would appear, that Mrs. Thornock may have made the

mistake of relying upon Lancaster's word, and signing something
which

she did not

really

intend.

The harsh, but expedient,

consequences of that would be that she is bound by what she signed.
Contract law requires, that a person read what she signs.

On the

other hand, that same unforgiving philosophy should apply equally
to those who draft, as well as sign, written agreements. Before an
insurance company cajoles someone into releasing her claims, it
should be careful to get the paperwork correct.

Otherwise, it,

too, should be bound by what is written, rather than what may have
been intended.
(A)
As a Matter of Law, a Party Who
Specifically Identified in a Release
Cannot be Discharged by that Release

is

Not

The Court's unanimous holding in Child is unequivocal--"a
release

must

contain

language

either

naming

the defendant

or

identifying the defendant with some degree of specificity in order
to discharge

that

defendant

from

liability."

892

P.2d

at

12

(emphasis added) . That case and rule are dispositive. Mrs. Jensen
cannot be discharged by the release because she is neither named
nor specifically described therein.

11

Child expressly precludes

resorting to extrinsic evidence to add or change who is being
discharged.
Defendant argued, below, that Child does not apply because
Mrs.

Thornock

defendant.

was not

seeking

to recover

from more

than

one

It is true that, in Child, the plaintiff released the

driver and owners of the vehicle in which his decedent had been
riding, and that the issue was whether or not the driver of another
vehicle was discharged.

Yet, neither the language of the statute

cited nor the reasoning of the Court limits the holding in Child to
cases

where

negligent.

more

than

one

party

was

alleged

to

be

actively

Indeed, the statute, by its plain terms, applies to

"[a] release given by a person seeking recovery . . . " §78-27-42,
U.C.A.

It does not specify from whom or from how many recovery

must be sought.

It certainly does not say "seeking recovery from

joint-tortfeasors."

There is nothing in Child, which limits its

application based upon the number or nature of the tortfeasors. 892
P.2d at 10-12.4
Defendant completely misstated the holding in Child by arguing
that it turned upon whom the parties to the release intended to
discharge (R.44).

What the Court actually held, was that, insofar

4

Ironically, the parties named in the release in Child
included the parents of the driver of the vehicle in which the
decedent was riding. Their only exposure was as the owners of the
vehicle--precisely, the same as Mr. Jensen's potential exposure
here.
12

as the identity of those being discharged is concerned, the intent
of the parties is to be determined solely by who is named or
specifically described.

See 892 P.2d at 11.

Indeed, had it held

otherwise, it would have had no reason or basis to overrule part of
Krauss.

See Child, 892 P.2d at 11, n.4 (discussing Krauss v. UDOT,

852 P. 2d 1014) .

In Krauss, the court held that UDOT was not

discharged, but it did so by looking beyond whether or not UDOT was
named in the release and by considering extrinsic evidence of the
parties' intent. See 852 P.2d at 1022-23. Under Child, the inquiry
should have halted with the fact, that UDOT was neither named nor
described.

The same is true here.

Regardless of who or how many

others were or might have been liable and to what extent, Dorothy
Jensen was not named in the release.

She cannot be discharged.

Defendant made a half-hearted attempt to claim that she was
"identified"

in

the

release

with

a

sufficient

"degree

of

particularity" to meet the standard enunciated in Child, 892 P.2d
at 12.

Her position seems to be, that she is an heir, agent or

servant of her husband and, therefore, sufficiently identified.
Under this reasoning, if the plaintiff in Child had settled only
with the driver's parents, the driver would have nevertheless been
discharged under a boilerplate reference to "heirs."
Child suggests such a result.

Nothing in

Indeed, such reasoning is contrary

13

to the basic premise of the case, that boilerplate language cannot
be used to expand the parties being released.5
In short, under Child, Mrs. Jensen is barred by law from
claiming the benefits of a release in which she is not named.
was

intended

or

why

she

was

not

named

are

What

irrelevant

considerations. Summary judgment was improper, because there is no
written

document

specifically

releasing

this

defendant

from

liability
(B)
Consideration
of
Defendant7s
Extrinsic
Evidence Is Proper Only if the Release Is
Ambiguous, Which Creates a Factual Dispute
Precluding Summary Judgment
The name "Dorothy Jensen" does not appear on the face of the
release

(A.5).

She could not have obtained summary judgment by

merely authenticating and offering that release into evidence. She
needed Lancaster's testimony, as to the parties' intentions and why
the release names Lowell Jensen.
evidence,

which

the

court

That testimony is extrinsic

necessarily

5

considered

in

granting

In all probability, the "identifi[ed] . . .with some degree
of particularity" language refers to situations where potentially,
but remotely, liable parties are either unknown or too numerous to
name. For example, a release as to a corporation would typically
include, by description, its agents, employees, officers and
directors.
References to "heirs" and the like are intended to
preclude liability as to successors in interest for the acts of
their predecessors. Child does not permit an actively negligent,
easily named individual to bootstrap herself within the ambit of
such protection.
14

summary judgment.

It necessarily erred by ignoring Mrs. Thornock's

contrary evidence and the fact dispute it created.
Releases are contracts, to be interpreted according to the
same rules of construction as other contracts.

See Krauss v. Utah

State Department of Transp., 852 P.2d 1014, 1018 (Utah App. 1993) .
The threshold issue of whether or not a release is ambiguous, is a
question of law for the court.

See 852 P. 2d at 1019.

If--and only

±JE — there is an ambiguity, may extrinsic evidence be considered in
order

"to clarify the contractual

intent of the parties". Id.

Accord Winecrar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991) .
Extrinsic evidence may not be used to create an ambiguity or to
vary the terms of an otherwise unequivocal agreement.

The court

below, therefore, erred one way or the other by holding this
release to be ambiguous, yet using extrinsic evidence to alter its
plain terms.
If the release was, indeed, unambiguous, it had to be applied
according to its plain terms.

See Winegar, 813 P.2d at 108.

It

had to be construed as releasing only Lowell Jensen, the party
named therein.
the

release

If Lancaster's testimony was properly considered,

would

have

to be

ambiguous.

In that

case, all

extrinsic evidence, including Mrs. Thornock's affidavit, would be
admissible

as

the

issue

of

what

the

parties

intended.

Her

affidavit denies that she intended to fully release anyone, which
15

renders summary judgment inappropriate because weighing extrinsic
evidence is a fact-finding function for the jury.

See Colonial

Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Const., 731 P.2d 483, 488 (Utah 1986);
Winegar, 813 P.2d at 108.
Moreover, the defendant, here, had the burden of proof with
regard to whether or not it was intended that she be released.

See

Krauss, 852 P. 2d at 1023 ("when a party not specifically named . .
attempts to avail itself of [a] release, that party bears the
burden

of

different

pro[of] M ).
from

insufficient

Mrs. Thornock's

Lancaster's

version

testimony was
of

events

material

(which

to carry defendant's burden, in any event).

Krauss, 852 P.2d at 1021-23.

was
See

Summary judgment for defendant on

this issue particularly was inappropriate.

See Colonial Leasing,

731 P.2d at 488; Winegar, 813 P.2d at 108.
Indeed, if any party should have been able to obtain summary
judgment on this issue, it would be the plaintiff.

Extrinsic

evidence may be used to clarify the parties' intent, not to change
the material terms of their agreement.6

The identity of the party

being released is certainly a material term.

Additionally, unlike

contracts in general, a release is not enforceable at all, unless
it is "unambiguous, explicit and unequivocal." Simonsen v. Travis,
6

If this release had just referred to "Jensen," extrinsic
evidence could be used to clarify whether that meant Lowell or
Dorothy.
16

728 P.2d 999, 1002 (Utah 1986).

Arguably, once a release is found

to

is

be

ambiguous,

unenforceable.

Id.

the

inquiry

concluded

and

it

is

simply

That is particularly true where, as here, the

release was drafted by, or on behalf of, the party seeking its
protection.

See Simonsen, 728 P.2d at 1002 (" [p]laintiff should

not have to bear the risk of understanding State Farm's intent
which was couched in its own ambiguous language").

Here, Mrs.

Thornock should not have to bear the burden of Windsor's inability
to write the release it claims to have intended.
As erroneous as the court's decision is, it is still somewhat
comprehensible.

It bears a certain logic to suggest that, if Mrs.

Thornock signed a release, she must have intended it to apply to
the driver of the car which hit her.7 Yet, the law does not require
written agreements to be logical.
clear.

It only requires them to be

The release in question clearly applies to Lowell, not

Dorothy, Jensen.

Any other conclusion requires rewriting what

Windsor Insurance put in writing.
And, therein lies the rub.
why

Mrs.

Thornock

would

It is just as logical to question

knowingly

7

release

Dorothy

Jensen

in

One problem is, that this reasoning could apply to any
situation wherein a party with remote or doubtful liability was
released. It would allow jointly represented or insured parties to
negotiate the release of the minimally liable, then argue that it
really meant someone else. Here, Mr. Jensen, as an owner of the
vehicle driven by his wife, had at lease some exposure to
liability.
17

exchange for $460.00, as it is to question why Lowell would be
released at all.

If the uninformed, unrepresented accident victim

is

to

to

be

held

a

carelessly

given

signature,

then

the

sophisticated, aggressive insurer must be held to the plain terms
of the release which it drafted.

The only reasonable alternative

would be to allow both parties a reprieve, and submit the matter to
a j ury.

CONCLUSION
The court below erred in just substituting "Dorothy Jensen"
for "Lowell Jensen" in the release, particularly if the release was
unambiguous, as the court found.
are discharged by a release.
discharged.

Alternatively,

Under Child, only named parties

Defendant was not named; she is not
if

there

was

some

clarification, there is an issue of fact for the jury.

need

for

In either

event, summary judgment for defendant was improper.
Plaintiff respectfully submits, that the decision granting
defendant's motion for summary judgment should be reversed, and
this case remanded for further proceedings.
DATED this

/ *?

day of

J&b—

, 1997.

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Appellant

Bv:

_^-U

%^

ALBERT W. GRAY f J
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XI.
ADDENDUM

1-4

Order Granting Summary Judgment, entered 7/30/96 (R.62-65)

5

Release (R.30)
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Stephen J. Trayner, #4928
Kenneth W. Maxwell, #6609
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
#9 Exchange Place
Sixth Floor Boston Bldg.
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BONNIE THORNOCK,
Plaintiff,

)
]

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)
]
\
'

Civil No. 960901305PI

vs.
DOROTHY JENSEN,
Defendant.

Judge David S. Young

On June 21,1996, the Court heard oral argument on defendant Dorothy Jensen's Motion
for Summary Judgment. Defendant was represented by Kenneth W. Maxwell of Strong &
HannL Plaintiff was represented by Albert W. Gray of Robert J. DeBry & Associates,
The Court, having received and considered the parties' legal memoranda, the Affidavit
of Jim Lancaster, the Supplemental Affidavit of Jim Lancaster, and the Affidavit of Bonnie
Thornock filed in conjunction with the Motion for Summary Judgment, and having heard 013I
argument thereon, and finding good cause therefor,

3275.681

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

On approximately November 15, 1993, plaintiff Bonnie Thomock and defendant

Dorothy Jensen were involved in a motor vehicle accident at the intersection of 9000 South and
Redwood Road in West Jordan, Utah.
2.

The automobile driven by Dorothy Jensen was insured with Windsor Insurance

Group ("Windsor").
3.

On November 30, 1993, Bonnie Thomock met with a Resident Casualty

Claims Adjuster for Windsor named Jim Lancaster.
4.

Mr. Lancaster and Ms. Thomock agreed that Windsor would pay Ms. Thomock

$469.00 for out-of-pocket expenses, pain and suffering.
5.

In exchange for $469.00, Ms. Thomock executed a Release of All Claims

("Release").
6.

The Release provides in relevant part:
[T]he undersigned, being of lawful age, for and in consideration
of Four Hundred & Sixtv-Nine & 00/00 Dollars ($469.00) to the
undersigned in hand paid, and other good and valuable consideration, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do/does hereby and
for my/our/its heirs, executors, administrators, successors and
assigns release, acquit and forever discharge Lowell Jensen and
his, her, their, or its agents, servants, successors, heirs, executors,
administrators and all other persons, corporations, firms, associations or partnerships of an[d] from any and all claims, actions,
causes of action, demands, rights, damages, costs, loss of service,
expenses, and compensation whatsoever, which the undersigned
now has/have or which may hereafter accrue on account of or in
any way growing out of any and all known and unknown, foreseen
and unforeseen bodily and personal injuries and property dapiage

3275.681

2

and the consequences thereof resulting or to result from the
accident, casualty or event which occurred on or about the 15th
day of Nov., 1922, at or near 90th South & Redwood Rd.f-1 West
Jordan, Ut.
The undersigned specifically agrees that this Release of All Claims
releases all individuals, corporations, firms, associations or partnerships which allegedly could be liable for the above-referenced
accident, casualty or event. It is the specific intention of the
undersigned to release all parties who could be liable for the same.
7.

The Release does not identify Dorothy Jensen by name but rather lists the name

"Lowell Jensen."
8.

Lowell Jensen is Dorothy Jensen's husband.

9.

Dorothy Jensen's insurance policy with Windsor was issued in her husband,

Lowell Jensen's name.
10.

Lowell Jensen was not involved in the automobile accident between Dorothy

Jensen and Bonnie Thornock.
11.

Jim Lancaster listed Lowell Jensen's name on the Release because the insurance

policy was issued in Lowell Jensen's name.
12.

The Release is not ambiguous.

13.

The intent of the parties is clear on the face of the Release. The parties intended

the Release to apply to Bonnie Thornock's claims against Dorothy Jensen.
14.

The application of the Release to Dorothy Jensen is the only reasonable

interpretation of the Release because there is no grounds for any liability between Bonnie
Thornock and Lowell Jensen.
3275.681
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15.

The Release applies to the claims raised by Bonnie Thomock in her Complaint

against Dorothy Jensen,
16.

The Release is a valid and enforceable accord and satisfaction.

17.

By the Release, Bonnie Thomock has settled all her claims against Dorothy Jensen

arising out of the automobile accident on November 15, 1993 at the intersection of 90th South
and Redwood Road in West Jordan, Utah.
AND THEREFORE:
Defendant Dorothy Jensen's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and plaintiff
Bonnie Thornock's Complaint is dismissed with prejudice on the merits, no cause of action.
DATED this

of

>£>v

, 1996.

BY THE COURT

DavfdS. Young '
District Court Judge

*

/

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Albert W. Gray
Attorney for Plaintiff

3275-.681
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Stephen J. Trayner, #4928
Kenneth W. Maxwell, #6609
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
#9 Exchange Place
Sixth Floor Boston Bldg.
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BONNIE THORNOCK,
Plaintiff,

;
)
;

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
DOROTHY JENSEN,
Defendant.

) Civil No. 960901305PI
]
> Judge David S. Young
]

On June 21,1996, the Court heard oral argument on defendant Dorothy Jensen's Motion
for Summary Judgment. Defendant was represented by Kenneth W. Maxwell of Strong &
Hanni. Plaintiff was represented by Albert W. Gray of Robert J. DeBry & Associates.
The Court, having received and considered the parties' legal memoranda, the Affidavit
of Jim Lancaster, the Supplemental Affidavit of Jim Lancaster, and the Affidavit of Bonnie
Thomock filed in conjunction with the Motion for Summary Judgment, and having hear&x)raL
argument thereon, and finding good cause therefor,

3275.681
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

On approximately November 15, 1993, plaintiff Bonnie Thomock and defendant

Dorothy Jensen were involved in a motor vehicle accident at the intersection of 9000 South and
Redwood Road in West Jordan, Utah.
2.

The automobile driven by Dorothy Jensen was insured with Windsor Insurance

Group ("Windsor").
3.

On November 30, 1993, Bonnie Thomock met with a Resident Casualty

Claims Adjuster for Windsor named Jim Lancaster.
4.

Mr. Lancaster and Ms. Thomock agreed that Windsor would pay Ms. Thomock

$469.00 for out-of-pocket expenses, pain and suffering.
5.

In exchange for $469.00, Ms. Thomock executed a Release of All Claims

("Release").
6.

The Release provides in relevant part:
[T]he undersigned, being of lawful age, for and in consideration
of Four Hundred & Sixty-Nine & 00/00 Dollars ($469.00) to the
undersigned in hand paid, and other good and valuable consideration, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do/does hereby and
for my/our/its heirs, executors, administrators, successors and
assigns release, acquit and forever discharge Lowell Jensen and
his, her, their, or its agents, servants, successors, heirs, executors,
administrators and all other persons, corporations, firms, associations or partnerships of an[d] from any and all claims, actions,
causes of action, demands, rights, damages, costs, loss of service,
expenses, and compensation whatsoever, which the undersigned
now has/have or which may hereafter accrue on account of or in
any way growing out of any and all known and unknown, foreseen
and unforeseen bodily and personal injuries and property damage

3275.681
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and the consequences thereof resulting or to result from the
accident, casualty or event which occurred on or about the 15th
day of Nov.. 1993, at or near 90th South & Redwood Rd.f.] West
Jordan. Ut.
The undersigned specifically agrees that this Release of All Claims
releases all individuals, corporations, firms, associations or partnerships which allegedly could be liable for the above-referenced
accident, casualty or event. It is the specific intention of the
undersigned to release all parties who could be liable for the same.
7.

The Release does not identify Dorothy Jensen by name but rather lists the name

"Lowell Jensen."
8.

Lowell Jensen is Dorothy Jensen's husband.

9.

Dorothy Jensen's insurance policy with Windsor was issued in her husband,

Lowell Jensen's name.
10.

Lowell Jensen was not involved in the automobile accident between Dorothy

Jensen and Bonnie Thornock.
11.

Jim Lancaster listed Lowell Jensen's name on the Release because the insurance

policy was issued in Lowell Jensen's name.
12.

The Release is not ambiguous.

13.

The intent of the parties is clear on the face of the Release. The parties intended

the Release to apply to Bonnie Thornock's claims against Dorothy Jensen.
14.

The application of the Release to Dorothy Jensen is the only reasonable

interpretation of the Release because there is no grounds for any liability between Bonnie
Thornock and Lowell Jensen.
3275.681
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15.

The Release applies to the claims raised by Bonnie Thornock in her Complaint

against Dorothy Jensen.
16.

The Release is a valid and enforceable accord and satisfaction.

17.

By the Release, Bonnie Thornock has settled all her claims against Dorothy Jensen

arising out of the automobile accident on November 15, 1993 at the intersection of 90th South
and Redwood Road in West Jordan, Utah.
AND THEREFORE:
Defendant Dorothy Jensen's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and plaintiff
Bonnie Thornock's Complaint is dismissed with prejudice on the merits, no cause of action.
DATED this $@s

day of

^^jjJ^y
"

1996.

BYTHE COURT

}o <?• Vu^i
David S. Young
District Court Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Albert W. Gray
Attorney for Plaintiff
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RELEASE OF ALL CLAIMS
Know all men by these presents:
That the undersigned, being of lawful age, for^and in consideration of
to the undersigned in hand paid, and other good and valuable consideration, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do/does hereby
and for my/our/its heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns release, acquit and forever discharge

and his, her their, or its agents, servants, successors, heirs, executors, administrators and all other persons, corporations, firms, associations
or partnerships of an from any and all claims, acttons, causes of action, demands,rights,damages, costs, loss of service, expenses, and
compensation whatsoever, which the undersigned now has/have or which may hereafter accrue on account of or in any way growing out of
any and all known and unknown,foreseenand unforeseen bodily and personal irguries and property damage and the consequences thereof
resulting or to result fromthie accident, casualty or event which occurred on or about the
s>r ~" day of > V o i/„ . 19
at or near
*?<? "~ ^Tcr^^yj^ v^ s^^t? •<^s* us? <^£^
4^^^
^.
—

The undersigned specifically agrees that this Release of All claims releases all individuals, corporations, firms, associations or
partnerships which allegedly could be liable for the above-referenced accident, casualty or event. It is the specific intention of the
undersigned to release all parties who could be liable for the same.
It is understood and agreed that the party or parties hereby released do not consent to this release, admit no liability to the
undersigned or others, shall not be stopped or otherwise barred from asserting and expressly reserve the right to assert any claim or
cause of action such party or parties may have against the undersigned or others.
The undersigned hereby declares and represents that the injuries sustained are or may be permanent and progressive and that
recovery therefrom is uncertain and indefinite and in making the Release, it is understood and agree, that the undersigned relies wholly
upon the undersigned's judgement, belief and knowledge of the nature, extent, affect and duration of said injuries and liability therefore
and is made without reliance upon any statement or representation of the party or parties hereby released or their representative or by
any physician or surgeon by them employed.
The undersigned further declares and represents that no promise, inducement or agreement not herein expressed has been made
to the undersigned, and that this Release contains the entire agreement between the parties hereto, and that the terms of this Release
are contractual and not a mere recital.

THE UNDERSIGNED HAS READ THE FOREGOING RELEASE AND FULLY UNDERSTANDS IT.
Signed, sealed and delivered this

day of

Witness

^ ,

s ,$/>-^^JL-&
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Witness

LS

Witness

LS

STATE OF _
COUNTYOF
On the

S.S.
day of

..19

, before me personally appeared

to me known to be the person(s) named herein and who executed the foregoing Release and
has (have) read the foregoing releasee and understand(s) the contents tflereof and that

acknowledged to me that
__ voluntarily executed the

same.
My term expires _

y
Cl-147b

7/9'r

y^o

tr^7^>

^

/^L

Notary Public

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
APPELLANT' BRIEF (Thornock v. Jensen) was mailed, postage prepaid,
this

JiO

day of

f\&>$ruCf

f-y

Stephen J. Trayner
Kenneth W. Maxwell
STRONG Sc HANNI
9 Exchange Place, #600
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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, 1997 to the following:

